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USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO
DETERMINE COPYRIGHT LIABILITY FOR
MUSICAL WORKS
Shine Sean Tu*
Abstract
This article explores the use of Artificial Intelligence to help define the
existing testfor copyright infringementfor musical works. Currently, the testfor
copyright infringement requires the jury or a judge to determine whether the
parties'works are "substantiallysimilar" to each otherfrom the vantagepoint
of the "ordinaryobserver." This "substantialsimilarity"test has been criticized
at almost every level due to its inconsistent nature. Artificial Intelligence has
evolved to the point where it can be used as a tool to resolve many of the current
issues associatedwith the "substantialsimilarity" test when it comes to musical
works. Specifically, courts would no longer have to rely on a battle of the experts
or the use of lay observers to determine if a work is substantially similar to
another work. Artificial Intelligence can be used to help establish copyright
infringement in a way that is both less biasedand morefact driven. Additionally,
Artificial Intelligence algorithms could strengthen the notice function of
copyrights by allowing alleged infringers a means by which to check ex ante if
their work could be infringing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Popular music has become a huge business with total revenue in 2019 of
$11.1 billion (up 13% from 2018).' The financial stakes have, therefore, risen

JOSHUA P. FRIEDLANDER, YEAR-END 2019 RIAA MUSIC REVENUES

REPORT

1 (2019)

https://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/RIAA-2019-Year-End-Music-Industry-

Revenue-Report.pdf.
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2
significantly with copyrights playing a pivotal role. Cases involving musical
copyright infringement are complex and notoriously unpredictable. This is in
large part because the test for copyright infringement is fraught with problems.
Accordingly, record labels, artists, songwriters, and producers are increasingly
moving towards prevention (by changing their songs) or insurance to limit their
risks. Society loses important expression when artists stop producing their songs
or unnecessarily change their songs in fear of litigation. Litigation based on
copyrights that are not substantially similar to referenced work impedes the goal
of the copyright framework, which is to promote the progress of science and the
useful arts. 3 Additionally, consumer costs are increased if record labels and
producers have to shift the costs of liability insurance onto consumers.
Musicians have been borrowing musical elements from prior works
when composing new music since at least the 17th century. 4 As noted by Edward
Lee, the extent of musical borrowing "is so large that it has spawned an entire
field of research among musicologists and other scholars." 5 Musical borrowing
can take many forms, such as "transcription, variations, quotation, paraphrase,
6
parody, modeling, allusion, [and] sampling" among many others. The real legal
problems at issue with musical borrowing are how much borrowing is too much,
and when do we impose copyright liability?
The legal test used to determine copyright liability is one of the most
maligned tests in the legal field. Compounding the issue is the fact that this test
is completely judge-made law, as Congress has never given the standard, and the
7
Supreme Court has not weighed in to bring consistency in this area of law. The
test is "mystifying for both courts and litigants," "notoriously confusing and
confused," 9 and arguably "more difficult than creating the work in the first
place." 10 Judge Hand even candidly observed, "no principle can be stated as to
when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its
'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc."" This is even more
important considering that courts, such as in the case involving Robin Thicke

2

See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001); Michael W. Carroll, The

Strugglefor Music Copyright, 57 FLA. L. REv. 907 (2005).

3

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

4

Edward Lee, FairUse Avoidance in Music Cases, 59 B.C. L. REv. 1874, 1890 (2018).

s

Id

Id. (citing Musical Borrowing & Reworking: An Annotated Bibliography, CTR. FOR HIST.
6
MUSIC THEORY & LITERATURE, http://chmtl.indiana.edu/borrowing/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2021)).
7

See MELVILLENIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

§

13.03[A]

(2013).

Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Do We Even Need a Test? A Reevaluation of Assessing Substantial
8
Similarity in a Copyright Infringement Case, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1375, 1384 (2007).
Rebecca Tushnet, Worth A Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REv.
9

683, 716-17 (2012).
10

Roodhuyzen, supra note 8, at 1375.

"

Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
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and Pharrell Williams' "Blurred Lines" versus Marvin Gaye's "Got to Give it
Up," have moved from considering only melody and lyrics (unidimensional
similarity) to considering other elements, such as harmony, rhythm,
orchestration, timbre, tempo, and pitch (multidimensional similarity).' 2 In sum,
the test for copyright infringement is a mess, and the tests for substantial
similarity mirror Justice Stewart's famous statement, "I know it when I see it."13
In general, the prima facie case of copyright infringement requires three
elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright in the work, (2) actual copying by
the defendant ("extrinsic/copying" prong), and (3) the defendant's copying
constituting an improper appropriation ("intrinsic/unlawful copying" prong).14
This Article focuses only on elements two and three. The "extrinsic/copying"
prong requires that the alleged infringer "copied" the referenced work and did
not independently create the work. The "intrinsic/unlawful copying" prong
requires that the alleged infringer copied enough of the referenced work's
original expression to create a "substantially similar" work.
Much of the problem with the current test for copyright infringement for
music lies in the fact that the infringement analysis does not allow for expert
testimony in every step of the analysis. Not only is the cost of expert testimony
prohibitive for many litigants, but courts specifically disallow expert testimony
in some parts of the infringement analysis. When not informed by expert
testimony, all tests for musical copyright infringement can be overly narrow. For
example, without expert testimony, the test is underinclusive because the fact
finder may not be qualified to determine the responses of the particular audience
for whom the music has been composed.15 This Article argues that Artificial
Intelligence ("Al") may not only offer a solution to the expert analysis issue but
may also result in some consistency when it comes to copyright infringement of
musical works.
Al algorithms are already being used to identify and remove illicit
content from websites such as YouTube, Google, Facebook, and other online
platforms. 16 Accordingly, AI is already being used to detect and determine

Joseph P. Fishman, Music as a Matter of Law, 131 HARV. L. REv. 1861, 1872-73 (2018);
see also Ben Sisario & Noah Smith, "BlurredLines" Infringed on Marvin Gaye Copyright, Jury
Rules, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/20 15/03/11/business/media/blurredlines-infringed-on-marvin-gaye-copyright-jury-rules.html?searchResultPosition=1.
2

13

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Roodhuyzen,

supra note 8, at 1376.

A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING

14

MARSHALL

15

Michael Der Manuelian, The Role of the Expert Witness in Music Copyright Infringement

COPYRIGHT LAW 413 (7th ed. 2019).

Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 127, 144 (1988).
16
Dan Burk, Algorithmic FairUse, 86 U. CHI. L. REv. 283, 284 (2019); Maayan Perel & Niva
Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic CopyrightEnforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 473,
478-81 (2016); Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harborsand the Transformation of CopyrightLaw,

93 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 499, 539, 543-44 (2017) (naming "Scribid, 4shared, Dropbox, YouTube,
Facebook, SoundCloud, Twitch, TuneCore, Tumblr, Veoh, and Vimeo" as companies already
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7
copyright infringement when it comes to the digital media.' Some commentators
warn of the possible costs associated with reliance on Al, such as "ersatz
objectivity, diminished decisional transparency, and design biases."'" With that
said, automated filtering systems protect large companies from the uncertainty
of catastrophic liability. Specifically, for platforms hosting user-generated
content or video and music content, use of automated filtering systems can help
these platforms take advantage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's
9
("DMCA") safe harbor from copyright litigation.' This Article suggests
expanding the use of Al to act not only as a filter but also as an "expert" when it
comes to infringement of musical copyrights.
Al has the ability to transparently assess substantial similarity not only
in the "extrinsic/copying" prong of copyright liability, but Al also has the ability
to assess the "intrinsic/unlawful copying" prong of copyright liability. Expert
testimony is already being used for the "extrinsic/copying" prong, and Al would
simply add an additional layer of transparency in this extrinsic step because the
algorithm that would be used could be agreed upon as an industry standard and
could even be adjusted based on different genres of music. For the first
"extrinsic/copying" prong, the algorithm could "learn" using an "unstructured
learning" system.20 Separately, Al could be used in the "intrinsic/unlawful
copying" prong through "structured learning" and improving the algorithm by
2
polling different users about similarity between songs. ' This would allow the Al
to improve the algorithm based on the actual "intended audience" for the musical
works. Finally, unlike many other proposals that try to overhaul musical
copyright infringement, Al can accommodate a wide range of musical forms and
a wide range of musical creativity.
Part II of this Article defines the different tests that are currently being
used to determine copyright infringement and some of the shortcomings
associated with these tests when it comes to musical works. Part III gives a brief
primer on Al and machine learning tools. Part IV describes the use of these new
technologies to determine copyright liability for musical works and the
associated costs and benefits. Finally, Part V concludes.

using automated copyright enforcement techniques); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Automated
CopyrightEnforcement Online: From Blocking to Monetization of User-GeneratedContent, JOINT

PIJIP/TLS

RSCH.

PAPER

SERIES

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1053&context-research

(last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
How AI Could Help FightPlagiarismin the Music Business, INQUIRER.NET (Dec. 9, 2020,
17
3:48 PM), https://technology.inquirer.net/06285/how-ai-could-help-fight-plagiarism-in-themusic-business.

18
19

Burk, supra note 16, at 286; see also Sag, supra note 16.
Sag, supra note 16.

20
21

See infra Section O.B.
See infra Section 0.C.
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II. CURRENT TESTS FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

In general, the prima facie case of copyright infringement requires three
elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright in the work, (2) actual copying by
the defendant, and (3) the defendant's copying constituting an improper
appropriation.22 Ownership of a valid copyright requires originality, fixation,
copyrightable subject matter, and compliance with statutory formalities. To meet
the "copying" requirement, 23 plaintiffs must show that defendants actually
copied the copyrighted work rather than creating their own work. 24 Actual
copying can also be proven by demonstrating that the defendant had access to
the plaintiff's work and by a showing of probative similarity between the
competing works.25 Finally, to show that a defendant's copying constitutes an
improper appropriation, the plaintiff must show that the defendant took a
sufficient amount of the original expression to create a "substantially similar"
work.
Infringement of musical works poses some unique problems for judges
and juries. Specifically, music is an intuitive art that can be nonverbal and
nonvisua. 26 Additionally, there are a limited number of notes and chords that
exist and even fewer notes that sound harmonious together. Accordingly, there
are common themes and sounds that frequently appear in various compositions,
especially in popular music. 2 7 Adding to this complexity is the fact that melody
and lyrics are not the only elements that can establish copyright liability. Factors,
such as rhythm, harmony, orchestration, and organizational structures, can play
a major role in determining substantial similarity.28 Thus, traditional
infringement analysis can be unreliable when applied to music.

22

LEAFFER, supra note 14.
Copying includes reproduction, creating derivative works, unlawful distribution, and
unlawful display as well as performance rights. Id. at 414.
24
Independent creation is specifically not included as "copying" the work. Id.
23

25

Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 844 (9th Cir. 2004). In a recent case, the Ninth Circuit

struck down its own "inverse ratio rule," which dictated that there is "a lower standard of proof of

substantial similarity when a high degree of access is shown." Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 352 F.3d
1051, 1066 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir.
2000)). This ruling brings the Ninth Circuit in line with the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits. Id
26

E. Scott Fruehwald, Copyright Infringement of Musical Compositions: A Systematic

Approach, 26 AKRoN L. REv. 15, 15 (1992).
27

Id. at 30; see also Random804, Axis of Awesome-4 Four Chord Song (with
Song Titles),

YouTUBE (Dec. 10, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5pidokakU4.
28

Fishman, supra note 12, at 1866; see also Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir.

2018).
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SubstantialSimilarity

Even if the plaintiff has shown that the defendant copied the plaintiff's
work, the test for infringement is still not complete. A court must determine if
the quantity copied is sufficient to constitute illegal appropriation. Courts require
"substantial similarity" between the copyrighted work and the allegedly
infringing work. Thus, "even where the fact of copying is conceded, no legal
consequences will follow from that fact unless the copying is substantial.""
Substantial similarity is an inquiry that is difficult and perplexing for
both courts and litigants. Substantial similarity is a legal inquiry that is guided
by several principles. The fact finder should first consider only similarities
involving the protected expressive elements and not those elements that are in
the public domain. Only the elements of original expression that were copied are
protected by copyright law and thus relevant for this analysis.
30
because
The requirement of substantial similarity is complicated
copyrighted works almost always contain original expression mixed with public
31
non-original
domain materials, such as facts, ideas, functional aspects,
32
Courts
elements, government works, and other uncopyrightable materials.
continue to struggle to develop a legal standard that balances the rights of all
parties. On the one hand, courts need to protect the copyright holder and leave
intact the incentive to create the work in the first place. On the other hand, the
courts need to be careful not to extend the scope of copyright protection and
33
hinder the "progress of science and the useful arts."
The complexity of the substantial similarity test is magnified by the fact
that the test is applied differently in different circuits. To determine substantial
similarity, the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits employ a two-part test: an
objective extrinsic test and a subjective intrinsic test. In contrast, the First,

29

Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004).

To add one additional layer of complexity, some circuits diverge from their normal test
when it comes to copyrights in software. However, copyrights in software are beyond the scope of
this Article. See Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J.
30

COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 719, 733-36 (2010) (showing the Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits' use
of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test when it comes to copyrights in software and showing
that the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits expand the use of expert testimony when dealing
with software copyrights).
31
Interestingly, some commentators have argued for "harmonic functionality." For example,
Sergiu Gherman argues that certain simple harmonies should be unprotectable based on notions of
music theory and the acoustic nature of sound. See Sergiu Gherman, Harmony and Its
Functionality: A Gloss on the Substantial Similarity Test in Music Copyrights, 19 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 483, 485 (2009).
32
LEAFFER, supra note 14, at 420; see also David May, "So Long as Time Is Music ": When
Musical Compositions Are SubstantiallySimilar, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 785, 785-90 (1987).
33

U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, cl. 8.
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Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits employ an "ordinary observer" test. 34
The Sixth and Tenth Circuits use an abstraction-filtration-comparison test.35
While most courts will use the core principles set out in these three tests, many
courts will use variations of these tests. 36
The Ninth Circuit's test requires an "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" analysis.
The "extrinsic" portion of the substantial similarity determination focuses on
which portions of the allegedly infringed song are public domain and which parts
are original expression. Expert testimony can be used for the "extrinsic" analysis.
The "intrinsic" portion of the substantial similarity determination is intrinsic
because it does not depend on the type of external criteria and analysis associated
with the extrinsic portion of the test. Thus, "because this is an intrinsic test,
analytic dissection and expert testimony are not appropriate." 37
The Second Circuit's two-part test requires (1) a determination of
"copying" and then (2) the trier of fact must determine whether the copying is
sufficiently substantial to constitute "unlawful appropriation." 38 Thus, copying
only trivial aspects of another's work will not result in liability. Infringement
only occurs when the copying is sufficiently extensive. 39 In this second step, the
trier of fact applies the "ordinary observer" test, unaided by dissection or expert
testimony, to determine whether the copying resulted in substantial similarity
between the works. 40
Finally, the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, used by the Sixth and
Tenth Circuits, requires the court to (1) abstract and separate the ideas and other
non-protectable materials, then (2) filter out the non-protectable components
from the expressive materials, and then (3) compare the remaining protected
elements to the allegedly infringed work to determine if the two works are
substantially similar.4 1
1.

Ninth Circuit Two-Part Extrinsic/Intrinsic Test

As noted above, the Ninth Circuit employs a two-part test: an objective
extrinsic test and a subjective intrinsic test. In sum, the first part of the test
compares the objective similarities of specific expressive elements in the two

Gabriel Godoy-Dalmau, Substantial Similarity: Kohus Got It Right, 6 MICH. Bus.

&

34

ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 231, 243 (2017).
3
36

Id at 247-48.
For an analysis of the variations on these tests, see id. at 243-49.

37
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th
Cir. 1977).
3
Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608-09 (1st Cir. 1988).
39

Id

40

Id. at 608.

See Kuhos v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 855 (6th Cir. 2003); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem.
Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 841-42 (10th Cir. 1993).
41
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works 4 2 The second, intrinsic, part of the test looks for "similarity of expression
from the standpoint of the ordinary reasonable observer, with no expert
assistance."43
i.

PartOne-Objective Extrinsic Test

The first prong of the test considers whether the two works share a
similarity of ideas" and expression as measured by external, objective criteria,
which is a question of law. This extrinsic step can require "analytical dissection
of a work and expert testimony." 45 "Analytical dissection" requires the court to
break down the works into their constituent elements and compare those
elements for proof of copying as measured by "substantial similarity." This first
prong helps the trier of fact determine which elements of the allegedly infringed
work are unprotectable elements4 6 (such as scenes a faire, public domain, or
uncopyrightable ideas) and which elements are protectable original expression.
When it comes to musical works, expert testimony can come from music
theoreticians, composers, musicologists, and forensic musicologists. These
experts can dissect both works measure-by-measure to determine whether the
47
defendant appropriated protectable elements from the plaintiff's work. This
analysis may take into account elements such as "melody, harmony, rhythm,
pitch, tempo, phrasing, structure, chord progressions, and lyrics."4" Additionally,
elements such as timbre, tone, spatial organization, consonance, dissonance,
accents, note choice, combinations, interplay of instruments, basslines, and new
49
technological sounds can also be taken into account. Forensic musicologists
can compare different works by transcribing similar parts, transposing them into
the same key for ease of comparison, then examining melodic, harmonic, lyric,
rhythmic, and structural elements. Forensic musicologists then can prioritize and
examine closely those elements that are important to the work. For example, in
Hip Hop, rhythm is often more important than melody, but the rhythm of words,

42
Skidmore as Tr. for Randy Craig Wolfe Tr. v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1064 (9th Cir.
2020) (citing Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002)).
43
Id.

Note that the extrinsic test examines the similarity of ideas and expression. Ideas by
44
themselves are not within the scope of copyright protection; only expression of the idea can be
protected by copyright.

4

Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004).

46

Note, however, that even if the individual elements are not protectable, a court could find
that the combination and arrangement of these elements (selection, coordination, and arrangement)
are protectable. See Roodhuyzen, supra note 8, at 1399.
47

Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 849.

48

Id.; see also Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 1999).
Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 849.

49
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accent patterns, and intonations might be important if they are the same in two
works.50 In contrast, folk and country music are more lyric driven.51
If there is copying of protectable material, then the court will move to
the second "intrinsic" part of the test. Again, only the protected elements of the
copyrighted work are essential for substantial similarity. Unprotected elements
in a plaintiff's work can be copied with no liability.
ii. Part Two-Subjective Intrinsic Test
The second part of the test asks if the works are intrinsically similar to
each other. 52 This prong examines the ordinary observer's subjective impressions
of the similarities between the two works. This question of fact is for the jury
and is the exclusive jurisdiction of the jury.53 The jury determines if the works
are subjectively similar to each other. The intrinsic test asks whether an "ordinary
reasonable observer" would find a substantial similarity of expression of the
shared idea.54 Accordingly, the members of the jury are asked whether the total
feel and total concept of the two works, in their ordinary and reasonable
perception, are substantially similar.55 Additionally, since the response is based
on the ordinary reasonable observer, no expert testimony is permitted in this
prong of the infringement analysis.56
iii. The OrdinaryObserver
When it comes to the Ninth Circuit's test, courts that follow Sid & Marty
Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp.57 are more willing to treat the "ordinary

50

See Colorado Law, Silicon Flatirons Conference: Lay Listeners, Sheet Music & Chord
Progressions,
YouTUBE
(Mar.
25,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTNufsgy22c&list=PLwFq2GL-

i5UiWv6s7HVKFQp39w314ijWq&index=2&t=0s.
51
Id.
52
Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that
a "plaintiff who cannot satisfy the extrinsic test necessarily loses on summary judgment, because
a jury may not find substantial similarity without evidence on both the extrinsic and intrinsic
tests").
5
Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1358 (9th Cir. 1990) (showing that the trier of fact must
decide under the intrinsic test whether there is substantial similarity in the expressions of the ideas
so as to constitute infringement and that the "intrinsic test for expression is uniquely suited for

determination by the trier of fact").
54
Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994).
5
Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 847 (9th Cir. 2004); Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton,
212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).
56
Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977);
see also NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 13.03 [E][3][b][i].
5
562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
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observer" as the likely customer of the copyrighted products, regardless of if that
customer is a member of the jury. 58 Specifically, the Fourth Circuit has found
that "where the intended audience is significantly more specialized than the pool
of lay listeners, the reaction of the intended audience would be the relevant
inquiry." 59
Both the Fourth and the Sixth Circuits narrow the ordinary observer
analysis to that of an ordinary intended audience member. The Fourth Circuit in
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc. 60 argues that the ordinary observer test should be
viewed as the ordinary intended audience member. 6 1 Specifically, the court stated
that only when "the lay public fairly represents the works' intended audience"
may the court use the ordinary lay observer as the ordinary person for the
3
ordinary person test. 62 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Kohus v. Mariol focuses
not on the lay observer, but on the intended audience member, and also allows
for the use of experts to help the trier of fact make the substantial similarity
64
determination from the perspective of the intended audience member.
Second Circuit-The "Ordinary Observer" Test

2.

The Second Circuit has a two-step test. The first step involves analysis
and dissection, and the second step involves an "ordinary observer" test. This
test asks "whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as
65
having been appropriated from the copyrighted work."
i.

FirstProng-AnalysisandDissection to Determine "Copying"

The first prong of the ordinary observer test determines if the alleged
infringer copied the referenced work. Even if the work is similar, there is no
copyright liability if the alleged infringer independently created the work.
Similar to the first prong of the Ninth Circuit test, this step involves separation

58
5
60

Lemley, supra note 30.
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990).
Id.

Id at 734.
Id at 733; see also B. MacPaul Stanfield, Finding the Fact of Familiarity: Assessing
JudicialSimilarity Tests in Copyright Infringement Actions, 49 DRAKE L. REv. 489, 504 (2001).
61

62
63

328 F.3d 848 (6th Cir. 2003).

Id at 857 (stating that "the second prong of the substantial similarity test should focus on
the intended audience. This will ordinarily be the lay public . . .. But in cases where the audience
for the work possesses specialized expertise that is relevant to the purchasing decision and lacking
in the lay observer, the trier of fact should make the substantial similarity determination from the
perspective of the intended audience. Expert testimony will usually be necessary to educate the
trier of fact in those elements for which the specialist will look.").
64

65

Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995).
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and "dissection" of the unprotected material from the protected copyrighted
materials. Also similar to the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit allows for expert
testimony to satisfy the first prong of this test.
This first prong can be satisfied if the defendant admitted to copying or
if, by circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact may reasonably infer copying. 66
Copying can be inferred "[i]f there is evidence of access and similarities exist.
[and] the similarities are sufficient to prove copying." 67
This test has been criticized in part because the trier of fact is exposed to
expert evidence in the first prong but then must "ignore or 'forget' that evidence
in analyzing the problem under the [second prong]."6 8 It may not be possible,
however, for a trier of fact to hear expert testimony on the issue of coping but
then discount that testimony to determine if there was too much copying. This is
especially difficult when it comes to complex works such as computer programs
or musical works. 69
ii.

Second Prong-ImproperAppropriation/IllicitCopying

The second step determines if an ordinary observer could recognize if
the defendant "appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff." 70 The
trier of fact, however, still must consider the work as a whole and use the "total
concept and feel" analysis.7 1 Accordingly, the trier of fact must now determine
if the copying "went too far as to constitute improper appropriation." 72 In doing
so, the trier of fact must look to only the copyrightable elements from the first
prong of the test and determine if enough of that copyrightable material was
taken to be substantially similar (and thus create copyright liability).
Interestingly, the Second Circuit for some types of copyrighted works has
enhanced the ordinary observer test to include a "more discerning 'ordinary
observer"' for works that have extensive similarity in unprotected material. 73
Finally, similar to the "intrinsic" prong of the Ninth Circuit test, the Second
Circuit does not allow the use of expert testimony to determine if there was too

66

CRAIG JOYCE, TYLER OCHOA, MICHAEL CARROLL, MARSHALL LEAFFER ET AL., COPYRIGHT

LAw 648 (10th ed. 2016).
67
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
68
69

Whelan Assocs. Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab'y, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1986).
Roodhuyzen, supra note 8, at 1391.

71
72

Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995).
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.

73

Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991).

70
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much copying. 74 "Too much copying" is determined solely by the trier of fact in
the second prong of the ordinary observer test.7 5
However, when it comes to musical works, the Second Circuit still
v. Porter.76 In Arnstein, the court gave the following analysis:
Arnstein
follows
The proper criterion on that issue is not an analytic or other
comparison of the respective musical compositions as they
appear on paper or in the judgement of trained musicians. The
plaintiff's legally protected interest is not, as such, his reputation
as a musician but his interest in the potential financial returns
from his compositions which derive from the lay public's
approbation of his efforts. The question, therefore, is whether
defendant took from plaintiff's works so much of what is
pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience
for whom such popular music is composed, that the defendant
wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the
plaintiff.7 7
The main problem with this use of expert witnesses is that it may be
impossible for the court to rely on expert testimony for the issue of copying but
not on the issue of too much copying because these two questions necessarily
blend together.
Additionally, when it comes to musical works, not all courts use a
heightened observer test. For example, while the Fourth Circuit stated that it
78
might allow use of a specialized observer for music, the Second Circuit has
79
specifically rejected this narrower standard for music.
3.

Sixth and Tenth Circuit Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test

The Sixth and Tenth Circuits use an abstraction-filtration-comparison
test. The abstraction step requires the court to separate ideas and functional and
scenes a faire (non-protectable) material(s) from the expression (protectable)
material(s). The court then filters out the non-protectable components of the
product from the original expression. Some courts will allow expert testimony

74

Roodhuyzen, supra note 8, at 1388.

75

See Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1002.

76

154 F.2d. 464 (2d Cir. 1946).

77

Id. at 473.

78

Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 736-38 (4th Cir. 1990).

Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (stating that "the test is the response of the ordinary lay hearer;
79
accordingly, on that issue, 'dissection' and expert testimony are irrelevant").
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for this filtration step. 80 The court then compares the remaining protected
elements to the allegedly infringed work to determine if the two works are
substantially similar.81 Finally, courts use the ordinary observer standard on the
comparison analysis. 82
This test suffers from the same problems that plague the Ninth Circuit
extrinsic/intrinsic test. Specifically, courts are required to separate out the nonprotected ideas/functions from the protected expressions.83 However, there is
very little guidance on how to complete this abstraction or filtration step, and
also the Sixth and Tenth Circuits' approach does not give guidance on how much
similarity is enough to impose liability on an alleged infringer.
B.

Use of Expert Testimony

A listener needs no expert or specialized knowledge to appreciate music.
However, expert knowledge is necessary for comparing two musical works for
infringement. Even though there is an almost unlimited number of permutations
of notes on a scale, there are only a few that are pleasing, and still fewer that "suit
the infantile demands of the popular ear." 84
The use of expert testimony varies depending on the work (songs versus
movies versus books, etc.) at issue as well as the different circuits. Plaintiffs
commonly introduce the testimony of expert witnesses to strengthen and
legitimize their claims. Both parties come equipped with experts resulting in a
battle of the experts (1) constituting a significant segment of the trial" and (2)
sometimes creating great confusion for the trier of fact. However, there have
been significant limitations imposed on expert testimony when it comes to
musical works.86
The Second Circuit, in its two-part inquiry, allows experts to be used on
the "dissection" step (the first part of the two-part inquiry). Expert testimony on
this step helps the trier of fact determine whether the similarities are sufficient to
prove "copying" from the protected work. 87 In fact, in some cases, expert

80

Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 856 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that on the filtration step "expert

testimony will likely be required to establish what elements, if any, are necessary to the function

of [the item in question]").
81
Country Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1284-85 (10th Cir. 1996); see
also Kohus, 328 F.3d at 853.
82

Country Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc., 77 F.3d at 1288.

83

Id
Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2d Cir. 1940).

84
85

Der Manuelian, supra note 15, at 128.

86

Id; see also Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); Sid & Marty Krofft Television

v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
87
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
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testimony is required rather than permissive. 88 When it comes to musical works,
the Second Circuit addressed the issue in Arnstein v. Porter, where the court
stated that expert testimony was relevant only to the determination of whether
two works were similar enough to establish copying but not to the question of
90
improper appropriation.89 Similarly, in Repp v. Webber, the Second Circuit
elaborated on the role of the musical expert by stressing the critical role expert
91
testimony can play in determining similarity. The Repp court effectively ruled
that expert testimony that supports a claim of striking similarity can satisfy the
first component (actual copying) of an infringement action even in the absence
of "proof of access." 92
93
In Concrete Machinery v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, the First Circuit
has elaborated on the "copying" portion of the test. In Concrete Machinery, the
First Circuit stated that "by dissecting the accused work and identifying those
features which are protected in the copyrighted work, the court may be able to
determine as a matter of law whether or not the former has copied protected
aspects of the latter." 94 Furthermore, the "copying" inquiry also helps determine
those aspects of the work that are protected by the copyright and that should be
considered in the subsequent comparative analysis under the ordinary observer
test. 95
The Ninth Circuit, in its "extrinsic test" also allows for expert testimony
to help the trier of fact with the specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed.
Specifically, in Krofft, the court stated that the extrinsic test depends "on specific
criteria which can be listed and analyzed. . . . [Thus] analytic dissection and
expert testimony are appropriate."96 Thus, the Ninth Circuit allows for the use of
expert testimony to help the trier of fact analyze the similarity of ideas (the
alleged infringer is allowed to use ideas) but does not allow for expert testimony
to help the trier of fact analyze similarity of expression, which is part of the

88

See, e.g., Testa v. Janssen, 492 F. Supp. 198, 203 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (Expert testimony was

required when plaintiff sought to establish striking similarity.).
89
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
90
132 F.3d 882 (2d Cir. 1997).
dat892.
91
92
Id. at 889.
93
94

9s
96

843 F.2d 600 (1st Cir. 1988).
Id. at 608.
Id.
Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
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"intrinsic" analysis.97 These criteria include the type of copyrighted work
involved, the materials used, and the setting for the subject. 98
The Sixth Circuit uses expert testimony when the subject matter is
complex. However, the court noted that if the subject matter is something like a
literary work aimed at a general audience, expert testimony will seldom be
necessary to determine substantial similarity. 99
The Seventh Circuit, which follows the Second Circuit's "ordinary
observer" test, has used expert testimony on both the first "copying" prong and
also the second improper appropriation prong. 100 Similarly, the First Circuit,
which also follows the "ordinary observer" test, also allows expert testimony to
help with the dissection analysis, even when copying has been proven in the first
step. 101
The Eighth Circuit, in Moore v. Columbia Pictures Industries Inc.,'0 2
also used an expert witness. 103 However, the court in Moore distinguished
between qualifications of experts in separate musical genres. Specifically, the
court admitted expert testimony but then discounted the testimony because the
expert "could not classify the songs as part of a particular genre."' 04 Furthermore,
the expert conceded that he had heard of the term "hip-hop" but had no
understanding of what it meant.1 05
C.

Scenes a Faire

One important wrinkle in the substantial similarity test is the application
of the scenes a faire doctrine. The scenes a faire doctrine prevents copyright
liability for "stock characters, settings or events that are common to a particular
subject matter or medium because they are commonplace and lack
originality." 0 6 The basic policy behind the scenes a fairedoctrine is that granting
copyright protection over general themes will hinder others from subsequent
creation of expressive works. Thus, expression that is indispensable for a
common theme will remain in the public domain to benefit all, thereby

97
Id. (stating that "it is intrinsic because it does not depend on the type of external criteria and
analysis which marks the extrinsic test. . . . Because this is an intrinsic test, analytic dissection and
expert testimony are not appropriate.").
98

Lemley, supra note 30, at 723.

99

Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 293-95 (6th Cir. 2004).
Susan Wakeen Doll, Inc. v. Ashton Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 451 (7th Cir. 2001).
Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2001).
972 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 945.

10

101
102
103

04
105

Id. at 946.

106

NiMMER, supra note 7,

Id

§ 313.4[I].

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol123/iss3/6

16

Tu: Use of Artificial Intelligence to Determine Copyright Liability f
COPYRIGHT LIABILITY FOR MUSICAL WORKS

2021]

851

"

immunizing the author from liability created from "incidents or plot that
07
necessarily follows from a common theme or setting."
Procedurally, there is some inconsistency as to how to apply the scenes
a faire (and merger) doctrine. Some courts use it as a bar to copyrightability,
others use it as a defense to infringement.10 8 Depending on the local rules, the
burden of proof will lie either with the plaintiff, if the court treats it as a bar to
copyrightability, or the defendant, if the court treats it as a defense to
infringement.' 09 Nimmer argues that treating the merger doctrine under the rubric
of substantial similarity is the better view." Finally, Nimmer argues that expert
witnesses can provide information to the trier of fact on what constitutes scenes
afaire.
Scenes a faire can be a little bit more challenging when applied to
musical works." 2 Should scenes a faire only apply to melody and lyrics, or
should it extend to the full panoply of musical elements? One case comments,
"[h]aving chosen the familiar theme of a broken-hearted lover seeking solace in
country music, the choice of a barroom with a jukebox as the setting in which to
unfold this idea simply cannot be attributed to any unique creativity on the part
of the songwriter."' 1 3
Additionally, there are limits to the scenes afaire doctrine when applied
For example, in Swirsky v. Carey," 4 the court found that a contested
music.
to
element in a "hip hop/R&B" song could not be considered as scenes a faire for
a folk song.' 1 5 Furthermore, a musical measure cannot be "common-place" by
definition if it is shared by only two songs.' 16
D. Academic Response to SubstantialSimilarity and Expert Opinions
It is clear that the test for copyright infringement is a mishmash of
slightly different tests with no underlying consistency. Accordingly, many have
criticized the use of "substantial similarity" to determine copyright

107

108

Id. § 13.03[B][4].
See Andrew B. Hebl, A Heavy Burden: Property Application of Copyright's Merger and

Scenes a Faire Doctrines, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 128, 131 (2007).
109
NIMMER, supra note 7, § 13.03[B][3][e].

"1

Id.

Id. § 13.03[E][3][a] (stating "it is hardly reasonable to expect laymen .
1"
portion of the plaintiff's work that it is protectable" on their own).

.

. to delineate the

Torrean Edwards, Scenes a Faire in Music: How an Old Defense Is Maturing, and How It
Can Be Improved, 23 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 105, 109 (2019).
Black v. Gosdin, 740 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
"3
376 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004).
''4
112

'5
116

Id at 850.
Id.
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infringement.'" A particular problem comes from the analysis of the use of
expert opinions, particularly what they should and should not be used for.
Additionally, there has been much criticism of the "lay listener test."
Paul Grinvalsky aptly stated that music requires no specialized
knowledge to appreciate, but this maxim is not true when comparing two works
for infringement.' " The "limited language" of music makes even the narrower
intended audience test inappropriate. As shown in Figure 1, Grinvalsky argues
that music can be viewed as a pyramid divided into four sections. At the base of
the pyramid is fundamental similarity (simple characteristics and public domain
materials). The next level up is genre (rap, country, classical, heavy metal, etc.).
The third level is similarity of ideas (either in sound or on paper) that is based on
expert opinion. The top level is substantial similarity with identical works at the
apex of the pyramid.
__
--

Identical Works

7

Expert Opinion

4

Figure 1
Grinvalsky argues that (1) experts should determine if the work falls above
or below the similarity of ideas plane and (2) the focal point for the fact finder is
to discern if the work falls above or below the plane of substantial similarity.'"
If the expert finds that there is no similarity of ideas, then the case should be
dismissed. Specifically, if the works do not share the same or substantially the
same relevant compositional elements, they cannot be objectively similar and
thus will fail the extrinsic prong of the Ninth Circuit test and will also fail the

"

See generally Alan Latman, Probative Similarity as Proof of Copying: Toward
Dispelling
Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 CotuM. L. REV. 1887 (1990); Lemley, supra note 30;
Roodhuyzen, supra note 8.
"1
Paul M. Ginvalsky, Idea-Expression in Musical Analvsis and the Role of
the Intended

Audience in Music CopyrightInfringement, 28 CAL. W. L. REv. 395, 396 (1991).
"9
Adapted from id at 423.
120
Id. at 422-24.
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"copying" prong of the Second Circuit test. Only if the work is substantially
121
similar to the reference work will courts impose copyright liability.
Some academics argue that music is unique and that music's complexity
"lies beyond any human understanding, which makes the result of an
infringement suit unpredictable." 12 2 With regard to musical works,
commentators have argued that infringement is based too much on the subjective
23
value of the judge or jury as a proxy for the intended audience of the music.
Additionally, especially with music, it is difficult to draw a distinction between
idea and expression. 124 Accordingly, some courts break a song down into
25
to help
characteristics such as melody, harmony, rhythm, and structure1
analysis.
similarity
the
for
used
be
to
categorize musical technicalities
Specifically, Yvette Liebesman has argued that courts should use technology to
objectively map a song's artistic elements and use mathematics to model a
song. 126
The "lay listener test" has been shown to create confusion with the
jury. 12 7 Specifically, jurors have a difficult time distinguishing between the
128
compositional elements in a work and the performance elements of the work.
In fact, at least one jurist has advocated for the use of experts for this second
29
prong of the liability test because lay hearers are incompetent on the issue.1
Accordingly, many commentators have suggested the use of expert testimony to
mitigate errors for musical works. 3 0

121

Id. at 422-23.

122

Austin Padgett, The Rhetoric of Predictability:Reclaiming the Lay Ear in Music Copyright
Infringement Litigation, 7 PIERCE L. REv. 125, 133-34 (2008).
123
Yvette Joy Liebesman, Using Innovative Technologies To Analyze for Similarity Between
Musical Works in CopyrightInfringement Disputes, 35 AIPLAQ.J. 331, 334-35 (2007).
Jeffery Cadwell, Expert Testimony, Scenes a Faire, and Tonal Music: A (Not So) New Test
12
for Infringement, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 137, 157 (2005).
125
John R. Autry, Toward a Definition of Striking Similarity in Infringement Actions for
CopyrightedMusical Works, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 113, 121 (2002); see also Tisi v. Patrick, 97 F.
Supp. 2d 539, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Paul J. Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric of the Public Interest:
Choir Directors, Copy Machines, andNew Arrangements of Public Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J.

241, 258 (1996).
126

Liebesman, supra note 123.

Jamie Lund, An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener Test in Music Composition
27
Copyright Infringement, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 138, 160 (2011).

128

Id.

129

Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 476-77 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting).

10

E.g., Cadwell, supra note

124, at 162-63; Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright
of SubstantialSimilarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 719, 766
Meaninglessness
The
Decisionmaking:
(1987); Alice J. Kim, Expert Testimony and SubstantialSimilarity: Facing the Music in (Music)
Copyright Infringement Cases, 19 COLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 109, 112 (1994); Lemley, supra note

30, at 740-41.
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Mark Lemley argues that the basic analysis for copyright infringement
is exactly backwards. Specifically, he argues that experts will usually not be
needed for the "extrinsic"131 or "copying"12 stage of the copyright infringement
analysis. 133 This is because the basic question that is asked at this step is, "does
the similarity between the two works lead you to believe that the defendant must
have copied from the plaintiff?"13 4 Lemley then argues that expert testimony is
also required for the second prong of the infringement inquiry, whether the
defendant copied more than a de minimis amount that was copyright protected.13 5
In fact, other commentators have argued that expert testimony is limited, or even
prohibited, where it is most needed-at the improper appropriation prong.1 36 The
problems associated with lack of expert testimony on the second infringement
prong are as follows: (1) expert testimony helps juries determine if the taking of
material was illegal, (2) expert testimony helps educate juries on the difference
between protectable and unprotectable elements, and (3) a jury-decided
"ordinary observer" test is not easily open to judicial review.1 37 Accordingly,
Lemley suggests (1) reversing the "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" components of the
test to allow for expert testimony "intrinsic" analysis;1 38 (2) allowing expert
testimony in both prongs;' 39 or (3) making the ultimate determination of
infringement (Prong 2) a question of law rather than a question of fact.' 40
III. BASICS OF MACHINE LEARNING

Simply stated, machine learning is the subset of AI which provides
machines the ability to learn and improve from the experience without being
explicitly programmed. There are two relevant types of machine learning: (1)
supervised learning and (2) unsupervised learning.

131
132

See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
See id

133

Lemley, supra note 30, at 737 (stating that "probative similarity doesn't seem a logical place

to employ expert testimony [but] experts may be necessary to assess basic questions of similarity
with complex technologies like software . .. [and] expert testimony can be useful where the issue

is one of merger or scenes a faire").

134

Id

135

Id

36

137

Cadwell, supra note 124, at 158.
Lemley, supra note 30, at 738-39.

See Kim, supra note 130, at 120-21.
139 See id at 122 (arguing that "expert testimony should be admitted for the benefit of the trier
of fact, at every step of the analysis").
40
Lemley, supra note 30, at 738-40.
138
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Supervised Learning

The goal of supervised learning is to forecast outcomes. The method by
which supervised learning works is by guidance from labeled input to known
output. With supervised learning, the algorithm is trained ex ante by giving it
data with known results. Thus, the training data contains labeled input as well as
labeled output. Thus, the training data acts as a mentor or a teacher for the
algorithm.
Teaching through supervised learning is accomplished through multiple
steps. First, the training data includes as many examples as possible of the thing
you are trying to teach. Second, there is a choice of architecture for learning the
model (e.g., classic neural networks, convolutional neural networks, or recurrent
neural networks). Third, creation of a penalty (loss function) that the algorithm
uses to determine the magnitude of an erroneous decision, and thus learn how to
be more correct the next time (i.e., performance measurement). Finally, the
mechanisms using technologies, such as Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) and
then Backpropagation, are updated.
During the training phase, the algorithm will map the known input to the
known output to validate the data. Once the machine is trained, it will be given a
new set of unlabeled "real world" data that it can then classify based on its
previous training. Thus, when the machine labels "real world" data, it creates an
inference between the data and the classified outcome. Typically, supervised
learning is used to address regression or classification problems.
In the musical infringement context, a set of experts could create a
"training dataset" by reviewing a set of songs and labeling the songs as "similar"
or "not similar." This could be done using previously litigated music cases as
well as songs that have not been reviewed by a court. The "training dataset" is
then given to the algorithm to learn which songs are similar or not similar. To
14 1
and
train the algorithm with a positive dataset, songs that were licensed
42
could
licensed
or
subsequently
infringe
to
found
were
that
unlicensed songs
be included. To train the algorithm with a negative dataset, songs that were
unlicensed and found not infringing could be included. Furthermore,
crowdsourced websites, such as whosampled.com, create databases of songs that
are sampled, covered, or remixed.1 4 3
The algorithm would learn from this training dataset so that it would then
be able to forecast an outcome from a new set of inputs. Under supervised

Licensed songs would be included because the second author would be conceding similarity
141
thereby securing a license.
42
E.g., Ben Sisario, Tom Petty To Share Creditfor Sam Smith's "Stay With Me ", N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 25, 2015), https://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/tom-petty-to-share-credit-for-samsmiths-stay-with-me/.

143
See About Us, WHOSAMPLED, https://www.whosampled.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 20,
2021).
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learning models, the algorithm will be either able to: (1) classify the song as
"similar" or "not similar" (binary decision) and/or (2) use regression to determine
how similar two songs are to each other (e.g., under a regression analysis the
machine could state that song one was 85% similar to song two).'"
B.

UnsupervisedLearning

The goal of unsupervised learning is to discover underlying patterns and
extract useful insights. Unsupervised learning works by giving the algorithm a
set of unlabeled inputs and allowing the algorithm to explore any patterns and
trends it finds to create a set of correlations essentially on its own. With
unsupervised learning, the algorithm is trained on unlabeled data without any
guidance and has to learn the output on its own. The algorithm will simply group
items with similar characteristics together, finding patterns and trends between
the datasets. This type of learning can be used to solve association and clustering
problems.
In the musical infringement context, the algorithm would be given a set
of paired songs, and it would have to look for patterns and trends between the
songs to determine if a song is "similar" or "not similar" to another song.
Clustering can be used to help classify songs into specific genres.145
Unsupervised learning would also reveal associations between songs such as
which riffs or sets of notes are scdnes afaire and which notes are copyrightable
expression. The algorithm would not need to be explicitly told which specific
notes to compare but would be able to detect problematic similarities on its own,
thus ensuring an even more comprehensive review than is typically possible with
lay observers.
IV. USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE CURRENT COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT FRAMEWORK

This Article argues for both a different type of expert witness as well as
a different role for this special type of expert witness. Al could fill the role of not
only an impartial expert witness for the first prong of the infringement analysis
but could also be used as an "ordinary Al observer" for the second prong of the
infringement analysis. When used for both prongs of the infringement analysis,
Al has the ability to become a powerful tool to help determine copyright
infringement for musical works.
Two different types of algorithm learning would be needed for the two
different prongs of the infringement analysis. Specifically, unsupervised learning
could be used for the first "extrinsic" or "copying" prong, while supervised
learning could be used for the second "intrinsic" or "unlawful appropriation"

14
145

See infra Section O.C.
See infra Section O.B.
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prong. Below, this Article discusses the general principles that could be used for
the AI framework as well as specific costs and benefits associated with the use
of Al for each prong of the copyright infringement analysis.
A.

GeneralPrinciples-Useof StandardAlgorithmsfor Each Prong of the
Infringement Analysis

At the heart of all Al decision-making are the algorithms. These
algorithms are created by the data and can include not only the traditional artistic
elements of a song, such as melody, harmony, rhythm, and structure, but also
elements of mathematical models as suggested by Liebesman. 46 Additionally,
rather than follow only explicitly programmed instructions, some algorithms
47
would allow the machines to learn on their own.'
If the algorithm is just the starting point and the Al is allowed to "learn,"
then there would be less need to create multiple algorithms to deal with
nonconforming situations. Musicians, music theoreticians, composers,
musicologists, and forensic musicologists could come together to work out the
elements needed to create a robust standard algorithm that could determine those
elements of music that were simply scenes a faire and other non-protectable
elements. These conversations could also include experts in music copyright as
well as Al engineers to help fashion the algorithm for use in the legal context.
The Al could also use a large library of songs to help refine the algorithm in a
meaningful fashion. Additionally, as. musical genres change and grow, so too
could the algorithm. Different elements of songs may move from copyright
protectable to unprotectable functional material or scenes a faire as more and
more musicians use those riffs or a new genre of music is created. The algorithm
could capture this change over time to help determine which elements are
copyright protectable versus unprotectable.
If there is one set of weights and measures by which most experts can
agree to create the algorithm, this standard algorithm could create consistency in
an otherwise sea of inconsistent analyses. Creating a standard algorithm has
many advantages in that multiple genres could be analyzed at once and no song
would be excluded from analysis. However, some genres of music may have
characteristics that bend the algorithm to the point where a standard algorithm
may not work. 14 8 If that is the case, then perhaps using separate algorithms for
this specific genre would create stability and consistency of analysis for
copyright infringement of musical works. The problem with using multiple

146

See generally Liebesman, supra note 123.

See supra Part 0.
For example, neural networks can easily classify classical music while jazz music presents
the most difficulty. See Muralidhar Talaupur, Suman Nath & Hong Yan, Classification of Music
UNIV.,
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algorithms for different genres would be that it would be more difficult to
compare works that cross different genres or works that straddle multiple
genres. 4 9
There would be tremendous advantages to the industry if a standard
algorithm could be agreed upon. This could be modeled upon the same standardsetting organizations that created Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory terms or
Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory terms for holders of standardessential patents. Furthermore, groups such as the Recording Industry
Association of America ("RIAA") and Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"), have
played a pivotal role as agents of change in copyright law's evolution when it
comes to the music industry. Because RIAA members create, manufacture, or
distribute "nearly 85% of all legitimate recoded music produced and sold in the
United States" and BMI licenses approximately "15 million musical works,"
these industry groups could easily help create this industry standard.150 In fact,
the RIAA has already created standards in music, such as creating technical
standards151 and creating the Parental Advisory Label.152 Accordingly, setting
standards in the music industry may be easier than setting standards in other
industries which may not have such concentrated and powerful industry groups.
B.

Use of UnsupervisedLearning Algorithms as an Expertfor "Extrinsic
Analysis" and "Copying" of Musical Works

In many ways, the use of Al as an expert witness for the first prong of
the copyright infringement analysis is not a revolutionary proposal. This is
because many circuits already use expert testimony to help the jury determine if
there was unlawful copying. 153 Thus, Al could be used in two different ways for
the first prong of the "extrinsic" or "copying" step. First, Al could simply be used
as a tool to help the court dissect the work and determine if there is a "similarity

E.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 599 (1994) (where 2 Live Crew's
rap version of "Pretty Woman" was found to be fair use of Roy Orbison's country/rock song "Oh,
Pretty Woman"); see also Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 492-93 (4th Cir. 2015).
150
About RIAA, RECORDING INDUS. Ass'N OF AM., http://www.riaa.com/about-riaa/music-orgs/
(last visited Feb. 22, 2021); About, BROADCAST MUsIC, INC., http://bmi.com/about (last visited Feb.
22, 2021).
151
Resources & Learning, RECORDING INDUS. Ass'N OF AM., http://www.riaa.com/resourceslearning/technical-standards/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2021) (stating that the RIAA participated in
creating standards such as the Global Release Identifier ("GRid"), Digital Data Exchange,
Watermark Payload Specification, the International Standard Recording Code ("ISRC"), and
DualDisc).
152
Parental
Advisory
Label,
RECORDING
INDUS.
ASS'N
OF
AM.,
https://www.riaa.com/resources-learning/parental-advisory-labe/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2021) (the
149

RIAA worked with the National Parent Teacher Association and the Parents Music Resource
Center to create this standard to address issues regarding explicit content in sound recordings).
153

See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 51 (2d Cir. 1986).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol123/iss3/6

24

Tu: Use of Artificial Intelligence to Determine Copyright Liability f
2021 ]

COPYRIGHT LIABILITY FOR MUSICAL WORKS

859

of ideas" between the two works. Second, AI could dissect the reference work in
a fashion where the non-copyrightable portions of the reference work are
extracted and only the expressive portions of the work are shown to the trier of
fact. These expressive portions of the reference works could be shown side by
side against the allegedly infringing work.
1. Algorithm as an Expert Witness
Al could be used in this first prong much like current expert witnesses
are being used. Specifically, the algorithm could be used to simply compare two
works and help determine which portions of the work are "copied." The
algorithm could be used to do the work that is currently done by forensic
musicologists and determine similar parts, transcribe those parts, transpose them
into the same key for ease of comparison, and then examine melodic, harmonic,
lyric, rhythmic, and structural elements. The algorithm would do this in a manner
consistent with the formula agreed upon by an industry standard. In many ways,
AI would simply be automating what is currently done by experts, and thus, it
would be slightly more impartial.
The algorithm would then determine which sections of the referenced
works were scenes a faire, motifs, or commonplace building blocks of music that
fall outside the scope of copyright protection. If the algorithm finds that there is
no similarity of ideas between the two works, the court could simply dismiss the
case at an early stage, saving litigants both time and money. Furthermore, if there
is a standard algorithm that is an industry standard, then the potential infringer
could run the Al ex ante to either change the work to avoid infringement issues
or run the risk of copyright infringement. Additionally, if there is great risk of
infringement, then the potential infringer could use the structured learning
algorithm to gauge the potential for unlawful copying.'
This system, however, would not work well if both litigants insisted
upon their own algorithm. If both litigants required the parameters of the
algorithm to be altered in significant and conflicting ways, the courts could end
up with a "battle of the algorithms," which is one of the major drawbacks
associated with the current framework for the first prong of copyright litigation.
Furthermore, this system could act as a check against litigation.
Specifically, if an alleged infringer did not run the algorithm against a database
of songs, then courts could impose enhanced damages such as willful
infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).

1

See infra Section O.C.
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Use of Machine Learning to Create a Scenes a Faire/Functional
Harmony Library

The extrinsic or copying prong of copyright infringement requires the
court to dissect the work to determine which portions of the work contain
protectable expression versus those portions of the work that are not copyright
protectable. Algorithms based on unsupervised learning are best suited to address
these types of problems. The algorithm could be given a large set of songs and
determine which portions are common to many songs. Ideally, songs would be
fractured into 10 to 15 second riffs. The algorithm would then use the unlabeled
data to determine which riffs had common elements and could cluster the data
into relevant groups. If certain riffs or certain patterns are found in many different
songs, then those portions may be considered functional1 5 or part of the scenes

afaire.
Currently, when songs are litigated, the two songs are compared against
each other, and the court relies on expert witnesses and their vast knowledge of
music and music theory to determine which portions of the song are open to all
and those portions which are unique and expressive.1 56 Use of unstructured
learning with an industry standard algorithm would create a library of riffs that
could be categorized as scenes afaire or functional if found in enough songs that
are in the public domain. This would give litigants the knowledge ex ante to
determine if their songs contained protectable material or material that could be
infringing.
Furthermore, using unstructured learning to create a library of scenes a
faireriffs can act as an escape valve so that music could evolve and adapt moving
forward by allowing musicians to use key riffs that define a genre. For example,
in Year 1, the Al might find that a piece of innovative music created by Artist X
should be protected because many portions of her song are unique and expressive
and help create a new genre of music. As those riffs become popular, in Year 20,
the Al might find many of those same riffs being used by many other artists
(artists would be forced to license those riffs during the development stage of the
genre). However, when the genre is better developed in Year 21, those riffs may
be now part of the scenes afaire and free for other artists to use. Accordingly,
the original would benefit from a required license for those first 20 years, but
then would lose copyright protection after those riffs become part of the scenes
a faire. However, note that this is not an unfamiliar concept, as this forfeiture
occurs in trademark law as "generic" marks.157 Thus, similar to a trademark that

155

Gherman, supra note 31, at 489.

156

See, e.g., Walker, 784 F.2d at 51.

157 A generic mark is a word that is understood by the public as the common term for a product
or service. Thus, if the primary significance of the mark to the relevant public refers to the class or
category of goods, then the term is generic. Examples include: "Band-Aid" for adhesive bandage,
"Kleenex" for facial tissue, or "Xerox" for photocopier.
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becomes generic, a copyrighted riff that becomes widely successful may lose
protection via the scenes afaire doctrine. This would allow the original artist to
monetize the work early in the copyright lifecycle, while not stifling innovation
of expression for long periods of time.
As mentioned in Section IV.A. above, the Al would be based on an
algorithm that would have the benefit of a large library of songs to help refine
the results. Alternatively, if litigators wanted to limit the universe of
comparisons, they could simply narrow the genre or type or specific songs that
would be used to "train" the Al. Accordingly, this Article suggests use of one
standard algorithm that could capture patterns from all types of music. Thus,
unstructured training could be based on a variety of different works so that
common associations and clusters could be mapped based on all musical works
and not just specific genres. Alternatively, the court could force the litigants to
agree upon one algorithm to be used by both parties, similar to forcing both
parties to choose one common expert.
To implement this system, you could piggyback off of a large music
provider, such as Spotify or Pandora. After listening to two song clips (no more
than 15-30 seconds), the application would first ask users to determine if the two
song clips were similar to each other. The application would then ask the listener
a set of "deeper questions," such as what elements of the clips made them similar.
The application would walk the listener through a longer set of questions to
determine if the song's melody, harmony, rhythm, pitch, tempo, phrasing,
structure, chord progressions, lyrics, timbre, tone, spatial organization,
consonance, dissonance, accents, note choice, combinations, interplay of
instruments, or basslines influenced the user's decision to mark the works similar
or dissimilar. "High scoring" users (users who score similar to musicologists and
other traditional experts) would be placed in an "expert group" to help guide the
AI's extrinsic analysis. In essence, these expert group users would be (1)
verifying the classifications generated by the algorithm and (2) helping to create
labeled data for the second "intrinsic/unlawful copying" prong of the test. This
type of analysis would help address the problems associated with the lay listener
test. 5 8
One problem with machine learning is that most machine learning
59
Al systems that are based
systems do not combine reasoning with calculations.
only on unsupervised learning will simply construct a set of correlations whether
they make sense or not. Accordingly, by adding reasoning to machine learning
systems (in the form of human verification by an "expert group"), these
correlations and insights can become much more useful. Thus, verification of

158
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Lund, supra note 127.
Stephen F. Deangelis, Artidcal Intelligence: How Algorithms Make Systems Smart, WIRED,

https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/09/artificial-intelligence-algorithms-2/ (last visited Apr. 5,
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specific riffs as "similar" or "not similar" by an "expert group" would help
validate the correlations established by the algorithm.
C. Use of StructuredLearningAlgorithms for "IntrinsicAnalysis" and
"Unlawful Appropriation"
Interestingly, AI can become "smarter" at distinguishing between not
only genres of music but what the intended audience deems substantially similar.
You can imagine using an application such as Spotify or Pandora to simply ask
its user to rank the similarity between the current and previous song or song
excerpt. When possible, the program should exclude those portions of the song
or excerpt that was deemed to be scenes afaire or functional (as determined by
prong one of the infringement test). The algorithm could generate a "similarity
score" as the Al becomes better at distinguishing the nuances between different
songs in the same genre based on input from actual consumers (the intended
audience).
Creating a standard training dataset that most experts could agree upon
would make the supervised learning step for intrinsic analysis more consistent
and more transparent. The results would be more consistent than our current
framework because the algorithm would apply the same formula and learn based
on every song used in the training data. Additionally, the results would be more
transparent because all parties would be able to examine and investigate the
algorithm and training data for any possible flaws. Furthermore, the algorithm
could be verified using data from the "expert group" of users as identified in the
"extrinsic" step. Alternatively, the algorithm could actually use the labeled data
from the "expert group" to help improve the supervised learning step. If done on
a large scale, the algorithm will become adept at not only classification of music
as "similar" or "not similar" but also at creation of a regression for infringement
(the algorithm could tell the potential infringer that the work is 80% similar or
95% similar to the protected portion of the referenced work).
Similar to the implementation above, you could use the "intended
audience" users in the lay listener group to help with the intrinsic test. Average
users may not answer the "deeper questions" but only answer the "is it similar or
not" question. Additionally, you could determine the genres of music associated
with each user, thereby creating an "intended audience" database. By simply
tracking the number of hours of listening to a specific genre of songs, the
application could code each user as a "lay listener" of a specific genre of music.
By creating this cohort of "lay listeners," you could then ask them questions
regarding substantial similarity by sharing the edited versions of the song where
the common elements (as determined by the algorithm in the first prong) were
removed. Accordingly, the "lay listeners" or "intended audience members"
should not be influenced by those elements that are common or functional to all
songs, especially if they listen to only one genre of music. This type of structured

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol123/iss3/6

28

Tu: Use of Artificial Intelligence to Determine Copyright Liability f
COPYRIGHT LIABILITY FOR MUSICAL WORKS

20211]

863

learning, however, may not address the inherent confusion many lay listeners
have with musical works.' 60
An additional advantage of using an algorithm for the
"intrinsic/unlawful copying" prong is that the algorithm not only classifies the
data but gives a regression. Specifically, with a regression, you could create a
sliding royalty rate. For example, two potentially infringing songs are run
through the algorithm. The algorithm (with "expert group" verification)
determines that song one has a 60% similarity score when compared to the
protected elements of the referenced work. In contrast, the algorithm determines
that song two has a 95% similarity score when compared to the same referenced
work. The owners of the referenced work could then charge more to the author
of song two when compared to the author of song one. Additionally, it would
allow the author of song one ex ante to determine whether it is worth the risk to
go ahead without licensing with the owner of the referenced work. If courts or
legislatures could come up with a numerical cutoff for substantial similarity, then
all authors could know their risk of copyright infringement before engaging in
costly marketing and distribution of a song.
This system would shift the nature of copyright liability for both
songwriters and producers. Songwriters could ex ante determine if their songs
are "too similar" and thus should be changed or risk litigation. In contrast, if the
algorithm determined the songs to be "not similar," songwriters could then keep
their expressive work the way it was originally written, thereby promoting the
"progress of science and the useful arts." Additionally, producers and record
labels would no longer have to purchase high priced liability insurance to protect
against unlawful copying because they would know the risk of infringement ex
ante and either force the songwriter to change the song or face possible liability.
Hopefully, this savings would be passed along to the consumer in both a higher
volume of expressive works as well as lower prices for music.
D. Social Benefits Associated with Using A] to Determine Copyright
Infringement
1. Notice Function of Copyrights
There are several key benefits associated with the use of Al to help
determine copyright infringement. The first benefit is related to the notice
function of copyrights. Patent law has long recognized the importance of notice
to downstream inventors.' 61 Through the use of patent claims, inventors attempt
to give notice to the world of the scope of their rights. Use of Al could serve a
similar function by giving musicians some general guidance as to what may or
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Duncan Parking Techs., Inc. v. IPS Grp., Inc., 914 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (stating that
"the public has a right to rely on the language of patent claims").
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may not be infringing before they go through the costly exercise of production
and distribution of the musical work.
The current ex post nature of the substantial similarity regime puts
smaller, unestablished, undercapitalized artists at a severe disadvantage against
well-capitalized record labels which can aggressively litigate alleged
infringement. 162 Although Joseph Fishman focuses on the melody of musical
works, he looks at infringement through the lens of facilitation of downstream
composers' future creativity. 63 Use of Al could address two major issues
associated with the notice function needed for copyrights. First, it would give
artists the ability ex ante to predict whether their work infringes the prior work.
Second, it would help establish the boundaries of the owners' entitlements the
moment they were created, instead of establishing them through costly litigation.
The current substantial similarity test requires most musicians to create
first and then
wait to see if litigation ensues. Even if an author knows that his
work shares some features with an earlier sound recording, there
is no instinctive means by which that author can predict whether
the similarity between the two works will be regarded as
excessive, and result in an infringement judgment. 64
As previous commentators have acknowledged, jurors have a difficult time
distinguishing infringement of the composition versus the sound recording.165
Because Al determinations should be more consistent compared to jury verdicts,
future artists could ex ante determine if they have borrowed "too much."
Additionally, because the algorithm would be trained by music experts, the
algorithm should not be "fooled" by changes in elements such as timbre,
orchestration, tempo, key, and style. Thus, the use of Al would allow musicians
to test first and either change the work or accept the risk if the algorithm found
the new work to be "too similar" to the prior work.
2.

Valuation

Another benefit associated with the use of Al is the fact that it could
adjust copyright scope based in time. The algorithm would be constantly taking
in new information and incorporating new musical works. Consequently, as a
work gets older, the algorithm might find new patterns that were not previously
present. For example, if a new work comes out that establishes a new genre of
music, it could be found copyrightable when it initially came out and given a
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David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REv.
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Fishman, supra note 12, at 1870.
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wide scope of copyright protection. However, as time progresses and more artists
build upon the foundation set by the first artist, those musical elements that were
initially copyrightable may now be included as scenes a faire. Other
commentators have already proposed narrowing copyright scope based on
time. 166 However, these commentators use fair use to narrow the scope of the
copyrighted work. Specifically, these commentators argue that the older a
67
copyrighted work is, the greater the scope of fair use.1 In contrast, Al has the
ability to achieve the same result based on using the scenes a faire/merger
doctrine to negate substantial similarity. Use of Al is particularly amenable
because, as some commentators argue, the technical opinion of experts should
be heavily relied upon when applying the scenes afaire doctrine.168
3.

Transparency

Transparency is another major advantage of using machine learning for
musical copyrights. Transparency in the algorithm code used for unstructured
and structured training allows for all parties to investigate the potential strengths
and flaws of the machine learning algorithm. For example, in the context of
unstructured learning, if a musical work contains a unique element that was not
taken into account by the standard algorithm, then, under extreme circumstances,
the algorithm or training data could be modified to account for the unique issue.
Alternatively, if there is a genre of musical works that faces the same issues, a
different set of training data could be used for those works so that the algorithm
can better account for these specific issues. In the context of structured training,
transparency can occur at two levels: (1) the algorithmic level which is open for
all to examine and (2) the training level, where all the training data could be open
for examination.
Previous commentators have noted that transparency of algorithmic
1 69
Some may argue that Al does not
systems can be lacking for many reasons.
the choices made by software
because
transparent
more
make the process any
engineers and algorithms may be just as confusing as choices made by a jury.
However, advances in AI, such as Explainable Al ("XAI"), have created a suite
of machine learning techniques that produce more explainable models while
166

Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REv. 775, 799 (2003); Joseph P. Liu,
Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REv. 409, 412 (2002).
167
Liu, supra note 166, at 410.
Edwards, supra note 112, at 116.
Burk, supra note 16, at 301 (stating that transparency is difficult for algorithms because: (1)
of intentional obscurity due to attempted protection of confidential business information, (2) of the
esoteric nature of the technology, which requires technical expertise, and (3) even experts are
unlikely to understand how an algorithm operates even if it is open to inspection). This article
argues that programs, such as XAI, can help with the esoteric nature of the technology and experts
68
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maintaining a high level of learning and prediction accuracy; advances also
enable users to understand, trust, and effectively manage the algorithms.10 Matt
Turek argues that "these new machine learning systems have the ability to
explain their rationale and characterize their strengths and weaknesses to convey
how they might behave in the future."i7 1 Furthermore, these algorithms would
not be created only by software engineers, but in concert with all stakeholders
such as musicians, producers, musicologists, copyright experts, and Al
engineers.
4.

Move Control Back to the Creator

Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan noted that platforms such as Facebook and
YouTube act as "functional sovereigns" in that they create rules, apply those
rules, enforce them, and also act as adjudicators over those disputes. 172 Using
automated tools, such as Content ID, these platforms wield far-reaching
copyright powers that dramatically alter the copyright policy created by
legislators. Although individuals who use these platforms validly agreed to the
rules set forth by those platforms, it is doubtful that "notions of party autonomy
and freedom of contract were designed to serve as foundations for creating
private content protection regimes with global reach, pared with immediate and
automated enforcement." 173 Accordingly, these functional sovereigns have
moved copyright law from a public law framework (designed by numerous
stakeholders) to a private law framework (designed for monetization and risk
minimization), thereby upsetting the delicate normative balances set forth by
legislators. The framework in which these platforms police and enforce
copyrights are currently (and somewhat unsurprisingly) heavily biased in favor
of the referenced work owner's claim. In fact, once Content ID flags the material
as possibly infringing, the referenced work owner is "responsible for avoiding
incorrect results," such as "claims that result from misidentified content or claims
that interfere with authorized uses of content." 74
By forcing private actors such as Facebook and YouTube to recognize a
publicly created standard algorithm, we could help bring back a modicum of
public control over music copyrights. A similar possible solution would be for
platforms to simply add the use of a publicly created standard algorithm after
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they run their own automated copyright enforcement programs. If the standard
algorithm does not find the work infringing on a reference work, then the burden
of proof for infringement would shift to the reference work owner to show
infringement. This framework would allow platforms to avail themselves of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act safe harbor while shifting the default burdens
and presumptions against the prior-work owner. Alternatively, platforms could
simply replace their current enforcement programs, at least for musical works,
with an industry-standard algorithm.
5.

Allows for Multidimensional Analysis Without Loss of Notice
Function

Fishman argues for a unidimensional analysis using melody as the
hallmark to help determine if copyright infringement has occurred in a musical
work.' 7 5 One cost associated with this proposal is that composers who know that
a melody carries enhanced copyright protection will "rationally focus more on
writing unappropriable tunes than on other, easily appropriable forms of musical
expression."1 76 The benefit of this system would be increased consistency in
litigation and better notice to future artists of what is covered and not covered by
copyright. This loss of expression, however, is especially troubling since in many
types of popular music, such as the $7 billion electronic dance music industry or
77
the harmonic and rhythmic innovations of artists of color,1 artists rely not on
melody but on production of the underlying beats and harmonies (while melody
is "frequently the last thing to be ironed out").1 78 Using Al would allow for artists
to have their cake and eat it too. AI would allow for copyright protection not only
through an analysis of melody but also through a multidimensional analysis of
many elements associated with music. Accordingly, artists would not have to
engage in gamesmanship to create works that focus primarily on melody.
Additionally, it would give downstream, future artists the legal predictability
necessary to dispel their fears about copying a melody while changing many
other elements of the musical work. Accordingly, use of Al allows musicians to
focus on creating novel expression (regardless of if they copy the melody) while
giving them ex ante notice of possible copyright issues.
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Fishman, supra note 12.

Id. at 1913.

See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Blues Lives: Promise and Perils of Musical Copyright, 27
'7n
CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 573,592 (2010); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J. C. Bach to Hip Hop:
Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REv. 547, 625-28 (2006).
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Fishman, supra note 12, at 1899-901.
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Consistent Application of Inputs

Age-related hearing loss (prebycusis) is common and gradually occurs
when we get older. 17 9 Approximately one in three people in the United States
between 65 and 74 has some form of hearing loss.' 80 Usually, age-related hearing
loss occurs in both ears, affecting them equally. Additionally, because loss is
gradual, many people do not even realize that they have lost some ability to
hear.' 8 1
Accordingly, some jury members, as well as expert witnesses, may not
be able to hear the sounds presented in an audio version of the musical work.
These problems are not present when using Al to review sound recordings.
Because a computer suffers no hearing issues and is able to compare musical
works using a purely digital format, there is no bias created by hearing loss.
E.

Social Costs Associated with Using AI To Determine Copyright
Infringement

The first concern with Al deals with a problem that is associated with all
algorithms, which is that they are created by humans with all of the human errors
and biases. As with all algorithms, the data must be collected, processed,
analyzed, and evaluated by experts. Accordingly, the algorithm will necessarily
be biased by those who create them. Design choices for elements to be included
in the algorithm must be made, and subsequent weights must be given to these
specific elements. Each of these decisions will be the product of a human
decision, and thus the algorithm will be inherently biased by those human
decisions. This problem is associated with all algorithms not just those associated
with determining copyright infringement. This problem may be minimized,
however, by creating a standard that can be agreed upon by musicians, music
theorists, copyright experts, and the engineers who code the algorithm.
Additionally, by using learning models that piggyback on products like Spotify
and Pandora, you could imagine the algorithm being able to "learn" quickly and
hopefully in a less biased manner.
Another significant cost of using Al to determine copyright infringement
would be the role of fair use. Dan Burk and Matthew Sag have discussed issues
associated with copyright enforcement algorithms and have shown that the "take
down" discussion, when it comes to digital platforms, initially does not take into
account fair use analysis.182 Accordingly, the removal of online content may be
"final before the dispute reaches any forum in which defenses such as fair use

1
Age-Related Hearing Loss, NAT'L INST. ON DEAFNESS & OTHER COMMC'N DISORDERS,
https://www.nided.nih.gov/health/age-related-hearing-loss (last visited Mar. 6, 2021).
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might be considered." 183 In fact, Burk and Julie Cohen argue that fair use cannot
be programmed into these algorithms and that a fair use analysis will always need
human oversight or institutional infrastructure.' 84
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the fair use doctrine may
not be a major issue when it comes to musical works. Despite the relatively high
number of music cases decided under the 1976 Copyright Act, no decision has
held that copying musical notes or elements is fair use, and very few cases have
even considered fair use.' 85 Additionally, one factor in the fair use analysis is
transformative use/purpose. It is difficult to determine if incorporating someone
else's music into a song "adds something new, with a further purpose or different
86
character, altering the first [work] with new expression, meaning, or message."
Case law dealing with transformative use of musical works mainly focuses on
the transformative purpose of the music, which is "more contestable or difficult
to describe in the case of a musical work borrowing from another musical
work."' 87 Accordingly, this fair use issue may be less of a problem for musical
works compared to other copyrightable subject matter.
One possible solution, however, to the fair use issue is to use Al only to
help determine validity of the prima facie case for copyright infringement. After
this initial step, then the trier of fact could consider copyright infringement
defenses such as fair use. This combination of formal rules with accommodating
standards will allow for economies of scale while minimizing problems caused
by unforeseen circumstances and the individualized circumstances of
unauthorized use.' 88
Expanding the use of Al to determine copyright liability for subject
matter outside of musical works may not be appropriate. Musical works may be
more amenable to this type of automated analysis because there are a finite
number of notes and a limited number of notes and chords that are available to
composers that are consonant. As Fishman noted, when it comes to melody, "[its]
modularity and quantifiability enables second comers to make a reasonable ex

183
184

Burk, supra note 16, at 290.
Dan Burk & Julie Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructurefor Rights Management Systems, 15

HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 55-58 (2001) (stating that "[b]uilding the range of possible uses and
outcomes into computer code would require both a bewildering degree of complexity and an
impossible level of prescience"); see also Burk, supra note 16, at 291 (stating that "[p]rominent

computer scientists similarly expressed their deep skepticism that fair use could be programmed
into a technical system").

185
Lee, supra note 4, at 1874, 1900 (showing that 91% of the cases reviewed did not discuss
fair use at all and most cases resulted in a finding of no infringement or liability against the
defendants and concluding "the fair use defense was unnecessary for music defendants to prevail").

186

See id. at 1920 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
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Id.
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See generally Burk, supra note 16, at 297; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An

Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557, 575-76 (1992).
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ante guess as to whether they have taken too much." 189 This is in contrast to
attempting to reduce the dramatic plot of a play or a movie into a scientific
formula, which may be impossible to do. 190 Furthermore, music may rely more
heavily on expert testimony than other copyrightable subject matter.191
Additionally, fair use has customarily played a diminished role when it comes to
musical works. Moreover, Al may be better suited to determine common themes
and genres found in music than in other copyrightable subject matter, such as
pictorial or literary works. For example, it may be easier for an Al algorithm to
determine a common set of chords and melodies associated with blues music
than for an Al algorithm to determine the common characteristics associated with
a stock character for a literary work when it comes to the scenes a faire doctrine.
Furthermore, for theatrical works, it may be easy for an Al algorithm to
determine literal copying of words from a novel or film but difficult for an
algorithm to determine copying elements from the plot, characters, or settings.
Finally, as with any novel application of a new technology,
gamesmanship may be used to create confusion for the algorithm. Specifically,
"bots" that run automated tasks over the Internet may work to confound the
algorithm. In a fashion similar to Amazon's Mechanical Turk, bots can be used
to generate random data that can act to jumble the results produced by an
algorithm.19 2 Although at least one commentator did not find evidence of a "bot
epidemic," he did find at least five to seven percent engaged in "trolling" or
satisficing.1 93
V. CONCLUSION

It is clear that the substantial similarity test for copyright infringement,
especially when applied to musical works, is inconsistent at best and notoriously
confusing and unjust at worst. Judge Frank Easterbrook opined on the ordinary
observer test stating, "[a]fter 200 years of wrestling with copyright questions, it
is unlikely that courts will come up with the answer any time soon, if indeed

189 Fishman, supra note 12, at 1908. Note, however, that Fishman prefers the unidimensional
melodic analysis over the multidimensional alternative of trying to "weigh the importance of
multiple, interrelated dimensions simultaneously," which Al would be attempting to accomplish.
190
Id.; Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); see also Jeanne
C. Fromer, ClaimingIntellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 782 (2009).
191

Fruehwald, supra note 26, at 35 ("The best available evidence on the issue of independent
creation is undoubtedly testimony of experts in musical composition." (internal citation omitted)).

192

Douglas J. Ahler, Carolyn E. Roush & Gaurav Sood, The Micro-Task Market for Lemons:

Data Quality on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (July 29, 2020) (manuscript); see also Emily
Dreyfuss, A Bot Panic Hits Amazon's Mechanical Turk, WIRED (Aug. 17, 2018, 11:38 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-mechanical-turk-bot-panic/.
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Abler et al., supra note 192.
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there is 'an' answer, which we doubt." 94 Although the problem is currently
confined to the courts, the solution may be revealed through the fields of
computer engineering and artificial intelligence.
Artificial intelligence and machine learning tools offer two elegant
solutions to the problems associated with copyright infringement of musical
works. First, Al can be used as an expert to help determine which portions of the
referenced song are protected and which portions are in the public domain.
Second, AI can be trained to act as an "ordinary Al observer." This AI observer
can then act as an arbiter for infringement by determining if "too much" copying
occurred.
The benefits of using an Al system are that it can be regressive and can
evolve over time based not only on the algorithm but also on the training it
receives under a supervised learning model. Because the algorithm can be
regressive, it can create output to quantify how much protected copying has
occurred (e.g., the algorithm could tell if a song contained 10% copyrighted
material versus 85% copyrighted material). This information would help courts
and/or the trier of fact determine if "too much" copying has occurred.
If musicians, producers, musicologists, copyright experts, and Al
engineers could convene and create a standard algorithm for musical works, then
there would be many benefits based on economies of scale. Specifically, all
musical works could be compared when assessing what is functional and what
might comprise scenes a faire. Additionally, works across all genres could be
compared using the same set of standards.
Once a standard algorithm is created, legislators could set a specific
amount of copying that would impart liability. Musicians and producers could
determine their risk of copyright infringement before going to market. This
system would allow musicians to change their songs before investing the time
and money to market and distribute their works. Furthermore, producers and
distributors could then better evaluate their true risk of copyright infringement.
Finally, a standardized algorithm could take power back from platforms such as
YouTube and Facebook and place power back into the hands of all copyright
95
stakeholders instead of only those who wish to monetize copyrighted works.'
The costs and limitations of the use of Al to help determine copyright
infringement should not be understated. First, there is a bias issue prominent with
all Al algorithms in that humans will necessarily incorporate their biases into the
algorithm. This issue may be addressed by creating a standard algorithm with
input from all stakeholders. Second, there is a real concern with the fair use
doctrine as Al and other algorithms will necessarily have a difficult time
accounting for this defense. Luckily, fair use has not played a prominent role
when it comes to copyright in musical works. Third, there could be a concern
with transparency. However, much of this concern can be alleviated through the
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Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2021

37

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 123, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 6
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

872

[Vol. 123

use of technology that makes the Al decision-making process more
understandable and visible. Finally, this Article suggests that Al be used in this
manner only for musical works and should not be expanded to other
copyrightable subject matter.
Courts and commentators have come to condemn the "substantial
similarity" requirement. Its structure, scope, and purpose continue to confound
courts and scholars. 196 One possible solution comes not from the courts or
Congress, 197 but from computer science. Through the use of Al, courts, juries,
musicians, producers, and distributors have a way to escape the gravity of the
"virtual black hole in copyright jurisprudence." 98 Musicians, producers,
copyright experts, and courts should take advantage of this opportunity.

196

Shyamkrishna Balganesh,

Analysis, 68

The Questionable Origins of the Copyright Infringement

L. REV. 791, 794 (2016).
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Id. at 863 (stating that Congress played no role in the development of the infringement
analysis).
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